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THE NON-IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT REGULATORY
TAKINGS CASES ON THE STATE
COURTS: DOES THE SUPREME
COURT REALLY MATTER?
RONALD H. ROSENBERG*
INTRODUCTION

he principal theme of twentieth-century American history is one
of change. This has been a century of dramatic population
T
growth, technological development, physical expansion, and environmental modification. While these changes have undoubtedly improved the quality of life for millions of Americans, urbanization and
suburban growth have imposed adverse impacts on the natural and
human environment. With the rapid expansion of land-use during this
century, and as the expectations of improved quality of life continue
to rise, the need to limit or control the negative aspects of community
development became apparent to state and local government officials
and to many citizens. Early in the century, it also became apparent
that the traditional common-law legal techniques, such as public and
private nuisance and trespass law, would be incapable of fulfilling the
expectation of enhanced, high quality living conditions held by generations of Americans. This understanding of the limits of reactive common law methods led to the development of numerous land-use and
environmentally protective regulatory techniques that were designed
to plan for the future and avoid the adverse consequences of unconstrained community development. The legal and public policy
instruments of zoning, building controls, subdivision regulation, and
environmental protection measures were the results of this
development.
With the adoption of such legal techniques also came the creation
of governmental institutions to administer these regulatory programs
for the public good. Occurring initially in local gov~rnment and later
at the regional and state government levels, these land-use regulations
reflected an enlargement of the governmental role in the economy
generally, and were indicative of the greater power accorded government to affect economic and property rights for the common good.
At roughly the same time, a similar expansion of federal power was
occurring, leading to regulation of numerous aspects of the national
economy through the congressional exercise of the commerce power.
The political and legal culture of the first half of the century accepted
"' Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
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broad governmental powers and the subordination of landowners'
property interests to the welfare of the community. In that period,
property rights were clearly considered subordinate to the expressed
needs of the local community.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the rise in the
community control of physical development occurred as an essentially
legal development accompanied by significant popular support. The
police power was harnessed to serve as the theoretical basis for the
many forms of governmental regulation. In nearly all cases, land-use
and environmental controls were imposed as police power regulations
that did not require compensation to owners of adversely affected
property. When challenged in court, police power regulations were
usually upheld against a variety of legal attacks. With this regulatory
emphasis, our twentieth century system of police power-based landuse and environmental controls presented the universal constitutional
quandary: where does the community's interest end and the individual's autonomy begin? Stated alternatively, how far could local government regulate individual land-use for the general welfare without
compensating the individual who was adversely affected by new restrictive rules? From the earliest times, community regulations affecting individual property rights have been met with the argument that a
restrictive ordinance violated the property owner's constitutional
rights as protected by the Fifth Amendment. However, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated in his 1922 opinion in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co. ,1 "[s]uch words as 'right' are a constant solicitation to
fallacy."
Throughout the century, property owners have responded to new
forms of land-use and environmental regulation with continued constitutional pleas, claiming that a particular regulation constituted a
"taking" of their property. In such cases, the individual property
owner typically asserted that regulation representing the public interest had infringed upon his or her core property interests, thereby requiring the payment of just compensation. The analogy usually
employed was that, because the community was required to pay the
property owner when land was taken for public works projects, compensation should likewise be constitutionally required when public
regulations deprived the owner of rights to use the property. Such an
argument based upon constitutional principles would require a judicial determination defining the boundary between valid uncompensated regulation and unconstitutional regulatory takings.
Under the American constitutional system and our political culture,
the U.S. Supreme Court is viewed as the final arbiter of the meaning
of the Constitution. Because of this fact, the evolution of the Fifth
Amendment takings doctrine has generally been considered the prov1. 260

u.s. 22, 31 (1922).
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ince of the Supreme Court. In adjudicating individual constitutional
law cases, the Supreme Court acts as the judicial institution possessing
the legitimate authority to define and express the meaning of American constitutional values. The study of constitutional law requires the
examination of Supreme Court decisions in an effort to understand
and predict the meaning of constitutional norms in future cases. The
conventional assumption, therefore, has been that the Supreme Court
dominates the field of federal constitutional interpretation. A
subordinate assumption is that when the Supreme Court speaks, the
lower courts listen and implement the constitutional principles enunciated by the Court.
With this backdrop, it is important to test the assumption of U.S.
Supreme Court doctrinal authority and supremacy within the context
of recent Fifth Amendment takings cases. What is the actual effect of
articulating Fifth Amendment constitutional doctrine on the lower
federal courts and state courts? What impact does a U.S. Supreme
Court regulatory takings decision have on future cases? Ultimately,
how is U.S. Supreme Court doctrine received by those theoretically
obliged to follow it?
This Essay will examine the state law cases interpreting three recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving regulatory takings theory:
No/Zan v. California Coastal Commission/ Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 3 and Dolan v. City of Tigard. 4 After discussing the
doctrinal significance of these three U.S. Supreme Court holdings, the
Essay will examine the subsequent state court decisions applying and
interpreting these rulings. This analysis will then draw conclusions regarding the importance of state court adjudication to the entire regulatory takings area, and will evaluate the relevance of the Supreme
Court's rulings to the evolution of regulatory takings law in actual
practice.
I.

SETIING THE SCENE FOR MODERN TAKINGS LAW

The claim that governmental regulation unduly and unconstitutionally damages property owners' rights was well-known in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In a widely divergent range of
factual situations, the Supreme Court upheld a number of state and
local government regulations that had resulted in the closure of previously lawful business enterprises against takings challenges. The
achievement of important public goals-the elimination of alcoholic
beverages from a "dry" state; 5 the preservation of apple orchards
from cedar rust disease;6 the exclusion of livery stables from urban
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

483 u.s. 825 (1987).
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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residential neighborhoods;7 and the shutdown of a brickmaking factory in the path of emerging suburban expansion8 -was found to be a
legitimate objective, subject to regulatory control without compensation, even in the face of significant impairment of economic value.
During this period, the Court also acted to support efforts to protect
environmental quality from the adverse effects of industrial land use. 9
Consequently, prior to the New Deal, many forms of local health and
safety regulation were sustained against a variety of constitutionallybased criticisms, as the U.S. Supreme Court followed an accommodative course supporting significant governmental intervention in the
land-use context.
Perhaps the most sweeping constitutional affirmation of governmental power to regulate property use for the public good was the
Supreme Court's determination in 1926 that municipal zoning, on its
face, did not offend the Constitution's concepts of due process, equal
protection, or protection against uncompensated taking of property.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 10 the Court (1) signaled
acceptance, in constitutional terms, of state-authorized, local government-implemented land-use controls, 11 (2) created a low-level, or rational basis, due process standard of constitutional review, 12 (3)
expressed a presumption of validity for legislatively-adopted regulations, 13 and (4) placed the burden of proving the illegality of zoning on
the claimant challenging the regulation. 14 After the Euclid decision,
7. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
8. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
9. For example, in Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486
(1916), the Supreme Court upheld a local government air pollution ordinance
grounded in the police power against substantive due process attacks.
10. 272 u.s. 365 (1926).
11. Judge Westenhaver, writing the lower court opinion, correctly concluded that
"this case is obviously destined to go higher." Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid,
297 F. 307, 308 (N.D. Ohio 1924). He determined that Euclid's zoning ordinance, in
light of then-recent Supreme Court decisions like Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
discussed infra text accompanying notes 15-25, was "a taking of plaintiff's property
without due process of law, and that, as applied to property situated as is plaintiff's, it
can be sustained, if at all, only as an exercise of the power of eminent domain and on
the condition of making just compensation." Euclid, 297 F. at 312. To support this
conclusion, the trial judge cited decisions from Texas, illinois, Maryland, Colorado,
and West Virginia holding zoning ordinances to be takings of private property. /d. at
316-17. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Sutherland articulated a constitutional law theory that accommodated the emerging land-use and environmental regulation in a number of doctrinal ways. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 367.
12. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
13. /d. at 388.
14. This position, stating a presumption in favor of state land-use controls, was
espoused by the Supreme Court as early as 1915 in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915). However, Justice Sutherland's clear statement in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), that "if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed
to control." /d. at 388 (citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924)). Justice
Brandeis more explicitly stated this view in O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire
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the constitutionality of such zoning-based property controls would no
longer be in doubt-as a general practice, zoning was not a taking of
property in the constitutional sense.
The most important early Supreme Court decision to find a regulatory taking of property was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 15 In that
case, the Supreme Court struck down the Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania
statute that prohibited coal companies from mining anthracite coal in
certain inhabited areas to prevent the injury and destruction caused
by the subsidence of surface lands. 16 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. struggled with determining the constitutionality of a state statute designed by its drafters to protect public health
and safety yet having severely damaging effects on the property rights
of certain landowning firms and individuals. Justice Holmes characterized the Pennsylvania law as having limited public interest, and the
legal controversy as focused upon a number of individuals benefitted
by the ActP
In addition, the degree of adverse impact on the coal company was
of great importance. Under Pennsylvania law at the time, the coal
mining or mineral rights were recognized as a separate estate in land.
Justice Holmes believed that the effect of the recently enacted Kohler
Act was to make coal mining commercially impractical and "ha[d]
very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying [the coal]." 18 He ultimately concluded that "we are
in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 19 As aresult, Justice Holmes held the Kohler Act to be an unconstitutional
taking of property.
Justice Holmes' majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal established a
number of takings law principles that would be rediscovered sixty and
seventy years later by other Supreme Court Justices intent upon invigorating the takings doctrine. Three central ideas can be extracted
from the 1922 opinion. First, the decision advanced the view that an
expanding, urbanizing society may legitimately regulate the use of private property for the common good without compensation. 20 Second,
Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931). This presumption of validity has been followed consistently by the states for nearly 70 years, and has provided municipal zoning and other
land-use controls with a strong-legal position that could be overcome only by powerful showings of illegality. In his dissent in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting), Justice Scalia questioned the continued vitality of the presumption of validity principle in the takings context.
15. 260 u.s. 393 (1922).
16. Id. at 412-13.
17. Id. at 413 ("this is the case of a single private house").
18. !d. at 414.
19. !d. at 416.
20. Justice Hohnes recognized this necessary reality wheri he stated, "government
could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
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Justice Holmes believed that the regulation of land use was encompassed by the Constitution's Takings Clause and required compensation, just as did actual, physical takings of land. An excessive or
unlimited government regulation was just as unconstitutional a taking
of property as a literal governmental acquisition of land. 21 This idea
constituted a critically important and durable conclusion because it
established the Fifth Amendment as a potential constitutional limitation upon a broad range of future government regulatory programs,
notably those in the land-use and environmental protection fields.
Under this view, the mere fact that the system of regulation achieves
public, rather than private, benefits or prevents public harms is not
sufficient to sustain it. Third, although property rights might be validly regulated without compensation under the police power, there is
some point at which the public regulation "consumes" the individual
property interest and "at last private property disappears." 22 The notion is that public regulation exists on a continuum and when "it
reaches a certain magnitude,"23 or when it "goes too far," 24 the restriction will be recognized as a taking of property. Justice Holmes did not
elaborate on the precise meaning of these regulatory limits, but subsequent judicial interpretations have considered the diminution in use
and value to be of prime importance.25
ished without paying for every such change in the general law." !d. at 413. His prior
experience on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court certainly prepared him for
challenges to land-use control measures that were defended as being within the scope
of the police power. In Attorney General v. Williams, 55 N.E. 77 (Mass. 1899), aff'd
sub nom. Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491 (1903), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, of which Holmes was Chief Justice, upheld a Massachusetts statute imposing height limits in conjunction with condemnation of excess air rights in the vicinity
of Copley Square in Boston. The court approved the acquisition of the air rights but
added that compensation was unnecessary. "[I]t would be hard to say that this statute
might not have been passed in the exercise of the police power as other statutes regulating the erection of buildings in cities are commonly passed." /d. at 77. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes apparently believed that the landowner's injury was
more complete.
21. Recognizing that all property owners take their ownership subject to an "implied limitation" and that they must generally yield to the police power, Holmes asserted that this ownership subordination "must have its limits or the contract and due
process clauses are gone." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
22. /d. at 415.
23. /d. at 413.
24. /d. at 415.
2~. In Justice Holmes' view of the facts in Pennsylvania Coal, the Kohler Act may
have totally destroyed the value of the mining company's property rights. However,
in the context of contemporaneous cases, the Supreme Court had previously and subsequently upheld significant regulatory-induced value drops: 75% in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and 92.5% in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915). Consequently, Justice Holmes' conception of regulation going "too
far" might have been total or near total reduction in value. Therefore, it is understandable that Pennsylvania Coal was not cited or otherwise mentioned in the Euclid
zoning decisions four years later.
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Following the decade of the 1920s, the Supreme Court substantially
withdrew from the consideration of land-use control and environmental protection cases. 26 During that time, the essential meaning of Euclid was defined by the state courts, which generally ruled that
comprehensive police power land-use regulation would be upheld
without compensation. By the 1950s and 1960s, local government
zoning decisions would be accorded considerable deference when
challenged. 27 The low-level due process scrutiny applied in Euclid
had been translated into numerous state cases using principles of the
presumption of constitutional validity and the "fairly debatable" test
for analyzing local and state law. While the Supreme Court took
nearly a half-century hiatus from land-use cases, the state courts filled
the vacuum by relying upon supportive federal constitutional law to
fashion their own corpus of specialized land-use and environmental
law. While each state's regulatory jurisprudence had individualized
characteristics, they all relied upon the relatively undemanding federal
constitutional foundation for a growing list of public health and safety
controls.
With the coming of the 1970s and its powerful environmental protection movement, environmental regulation joined with the multidecade development of increasingly sophisticated and demanding
land-use controls and development exactions. At the same time, the
state courts began to become more active and effective in undertaking
judicial review of state and local government land regulation. The
general judicial deference of prior decades began to give way to
courts' demands for clearer and more defensible decisions28 and reviewable procedures. 29 While the state courts may have become more
concerned with judicial review of land-use regulations during the
1970s, they continued to be supportive of most efforts to protect the
ever-expanding conception of the public interest.

26. After Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (striking down the
placement of the boundary between two zoning districts}, the Supreme Court rarely
accepted any case raising the constitutionality of local land-use or other public health
and safety regulation until 1974 when it upheld a restrictive zoning ordinance in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
27. See NoRMAN WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAw § 5.04 (1988). Regulatory takings claims arising from land-use restrictions only reached the Supreme
Court once during this time frame in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962), where a sand and gravel mining ordinance was unsuccessfully challenged.
28. See De Sena v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 379 N.E.2d 1144 (N.Y. 1978); Texas
Antiquities Comm. v. Dallas County Community College Dist., 554 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.
1977). During the 1970s, some state courts also took it upon themselves to consider
the impact of land-use and environmental regulation upon other social interests such
as the availability of affordable housing opportunity for all income segments of the
population.
29. See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 522
P.2d 12 (Cal. 1974).
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The Revival of Judicial Interest in Landowner's Property Rights
in an Increasingly Regulated World

The 1970s heralded the beginning of widespread social concern with
matters of environmental quality. Major federal environmental statutes30 were enacted by Congress, and similar or supplementary measures were adopted by most state legislatures. The achievement of
many environmental objectives often had significant land-use implications. For instance, environmental laws commonly placed restrictions
on the use and development of wetlands, steep slopes, floodplains,
mountain ridges, beachfront areas, and sand dunes. However, as the
number and variety of environmental protection regulations increased
in the 1970s, a contrary anti-regulator~ theme began to emerge in the
evolving environmental public policy, 1 and in the developing takings
jurisprudence. In his dissent to the famous Supreme Court decision in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 32 Chief Justice
Rehnquist gave voice to the view that the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause operated to prevent certain severe regulatory burdens from
being imposed upon a limited number of landowners for the benefit of
society in general. 33 With this case, the Supreme Court signaled its
rekindled interest in the general field of land-use control as well as a
desire to enunciate new regulatory takings policy. 34
In the 1980s, the Court expressed greater receptivity to constitutional arguments against excessive land-use regulation and increased
sensitivity to the interests of property owners rather than regulators.
With the revival in interest in the regulatory takings theory during the
30. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7719 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993); the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
31. In the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress withdrew the authority
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ("EPA") to require indirect source
controls as part of a state's air quality implementation plan. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91 Stat. 685, 695-96 (1991); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(5)-(6) (1988). The
main rationale for this change to section 110 of the statute was to remove federal
power to control the location and operation of "indirect sources" such as stadiums,
shopping malls, and other attractors of large numbers of motor vehicles. The danger
in the eyes of the legislative drafters was that the EPA would be able to control major
land-use decisions at the local or regional level in the name of air pollution
prevention.
'
32. 438 u.s. 104, 145-48 (1978).
33. Justice Rehnquist noted the well-established proposition that the " 'Flfth
Amendment ... was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.' " /d. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 u.s. 40, 49 (1960)).
34. It has been reported that since the Belle Terre case was decided in 1974, the
Court has considered nearly one and a half land-use control cases per year. See 1
WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 65 (Supp. 1994).
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1980s, the language and ideas of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal
influenced the constitutional analysis in both the state and the federal
courts. 35 Justice Holmes' admonition against regulations going "too
far" resurfaced and was extended by an unlikely advocate-Justice
William Brennan. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 36 Justice Brennan wrote, in dissent, that local land-use regulators must observe the Fifth Amendment's limits, just as any other public official must comprehend the constitutional limits of his or her
power. He said, "after all, a policeman must know the Constitution,
then why not a planner?" 37 While foreshadowing the shift of the
Court to· a more conservative bent, Justice Brennan also argued for
giving the Takings Clause real meaning by imposing financial liability,
as opposed to mere ordinance invalidation, as a means of controlling
"overzealous regulatory attempts." 38
The decade of the 1980s chronicled an increased number of landuse takings cases reaching the Supreme Court and many new decisions attempting to provide updated meaning to federal constitutional
takings doctrine. 39 From this lengthy list of holdings, a number of basic doctrinal principles could be identified. First, the Court concluded
that compensation would be constitutionally required whenever a taking of property was judicially determined. This eliminated support for
the position that excessive regulation constituted a due process violation and should be remedied with the invalidation of the restriction.
Second, and derived from the first point, the Court held that a takin§
of property could occur for short-term or temporary periods of time. 4
Consequently, the reversal or reduction of an unconstitutional regulation would not obviate the requirement of government compensation
for the period of time the restriction was in place. Third, the idea was
established that a categorical or per se taking occurs when either (1)
35. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508
(1987) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987).
36. 450 U.S. 621, 649 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. 450 U.S. at 662 n.26 (1981).
38. /d. In taking this position, Justice Brennan argued directly against the thenprevailing state court positions held in California and New York. See Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. 1979); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New
York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976). Justice Brennan's dissenting view of the constitutional inadequacy of regulatory invalidation and the requirement of compensation for
a taking of property would become the majority position of the Court within six years.
See First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
39. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct.
1522 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English,
482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comrn'n
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1980); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
40. See First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
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there is a physical invasion of property, or (2) a regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land.41 Fourth, the Court
developed a clearer and more demanding doctrine regarding the relationship between the state's regulatory objectives and the imposition
of burdens upon individual landowners. This necessary relationship
has been termed the "nexus" requirement and was articulated in situations in which a landowner was obligated to contribute a property
interest-an exaction-to the government in exchange for permission
to complete a land development proposal.42 Fifth, the proposition was
advanced that the Fifth Amendment requires that a governmentallyimposed exaction be correlated to the nature of the development project and that its burden must be commensurate to the impact of the
project. This "rough proportionality" standard was required in tandem with two related points, that: (1) the government bears the burden of justifying the exaction, and (2) the exaction be imposed
following an individualized determination of its propriety. 43
Through this recent period of Fifth Amendment takings doctrinal
development, the Supreme Court has spoken about constitutional
meaning with its usual assumptions concerning the supremacy of its
adjudication. In a traditional analysis, one function of the Supreme
Court is to interpret the content of constitutional language and, in the
takings context, determine the nature of individual property owners'
rights against government regulation. In so doing, the Supreme Court
acts both to decide individual controversies and to establish federal
constitutional norms for subsequent application. With the incorporation of the rights secured by the Fifth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment,44 the Supreme Court's pronouncements in recent
takings jurisprudence have effectively informed state and local gov41. The Court did recognize an exception to the second prong of this rule when a
state or local regulation will "do no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieved in the courts ... under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
42. In the case of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), discussed infra notes 57-88 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court invalidated a
regulatory exaction imposed in the name of beachfront preservation. The lateral access beachfront easement was required as a condition to the granting of permission to
reconstruct a house on the California coast. Justice Scalia determined that the justifications given by the state for the required exaction were not sufficiently connected to
the obligation imposed by the commission. /d. at 837. In this way, the Court found
the exaction to fail a due process test and, at the same time, to be an illicit extortion of
the landowner's property. ld.
43. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). See discussion infra notes 13235 and accompanying text.
44. Although the Fifth Amendment prohibition against taking private property
literally applies to the federal government, it has also been found to apply to state and
local government via incorporation of its constitutional principles through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago,
166 u.s. 226, 239 (1897).
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ernment regulators 45 that there are now serious federal constitutional
limits to the reach of their programs. Through these decisions, the
Court has attempted to set the "boundaries" between legitimate, uncompensated governmental land-use regulation and core individual
property rights. 46 In an era of decreasing political support for intrusive and expensive federal control of local prerogative and independence,47 the Supreme Court, through its recent line of takings cases,
has reminded local governments that the U.S. Constitution imposes
costs upon them by recognizing in landowners enforceable property
rights and the need for compensation that may not be jeopardized by
regulation. The language of the Court's takings decisions over the last
decade has given attorneys, academic analysts, and the public at large
the impression that the Court is increasingly sympathetic to the plight
of heavily regulated or otherwise burdened landowners resisting the
45. This is not to say that the recent rulings on the meaning of the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment do not affect the regulatory or programmatic undertakings of
the federal government. Important recent decisions have found federal agencies liable for substantial damage awards when a taking of property has been found. See
Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 898 (1995) (government wetlands regulation could violate the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it worked a "partial taking" of property) and
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994), reh'g en
bane denied, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28462 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 1994) (the relevant
parcel of property for takings analysis was, under the facts of the case, only the wetlands burdened by the regulation, not the entire original tract owned and subsequently developed and sold by the landowner).
46. The reservation of ultimate federal constitutional power to determine unlawful
state and local government regulation creates something of a paradox. The Supreme
Court has frequently stated that the states have the principal responsibility for defining property rights within their jurisdictions. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972). However, federal constitutional takings principles apply uniformly to all
states, placing federal limits on any state's ability to develop individual property rights
concepts through its legislative, judicial, and administrative law. Through the application of a Fifth Amendment takings "floor," the Supreme Court has neutralized all
states' power to determine independently the precise meaning of "property" within
their borders. In this way the Court has attempted to federalize the meaning of property throughout the country by declaring constitutional property-owner protection to
be a high federal interest.
47. See NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CoNTRACT WITH AMERICA (Edward Gillespie &
Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). On March 3, 1994, in furtherance of the private property
objectives described in the Contract with America, the U.S. House of Representatives
overwhelmingly passed The Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CoNG. REc. 2607 (1995). This statute proposes to compensate
owners whose land has diminished in value by 20% or more as a result of specified
federal statutes. Furthermore, if land has lost more than 50% of its value, H.R. 925
allows the owner to opt for the government to purchase the entire tract at fair market
value. See 141 CoNG. REc. at 2629. For further discussion, see House Easily Passes
Bills to Limit Regulations, Gov'T & CoMM., Mar. 4, 1995, at 679.
In addition, on February 1, 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 5,
the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141
CoNo. REc. 1007 (1995). This bill takes numerous steps to limit federal legislative
and agency actions that would impose excessive costs on state and local governments.
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ever-escalating demands of state and local government. 48 This view
has also come at a time when anti-regulatory political forces have begun to exert themselves in the legislative arena, causing state legislatures and Congress to adopt anti-taking statutes in a variety of
forms. 49 As the discussion below will indicate, the limited impact of
the Supreme Court's holdings on the state courts may explain this recent emphasis upon legislative solutions to the perceived problem of
excessive environmental and land-use regulation.

48. For example, Dean James L. Huffman's Article about the recent line of
Supreme Court takings cases culminating in Dolan, applauded the apparent elevation
of the Takings Clause in Dolan away from its inexplicable "stepchild status" as part of
the Bill of Rights. As Justice Stevens noted, this "philosophical shift" in the Court's
thinking makes it clear, that "property owners have surely found a new friend." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2326 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Dean Huffman concludes
that such an analytical change
will restore fairness to the application of a constitutional provision, the purpose of which is to assure the fair treatment of citizens who happen to own
property. An incidental, and publicly significant, benefit of this shift will be
the reinvigoration of a property rights system which is centrally important to
the wise use of our planet's scarce resources.
James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction, 25
ENVTL. L. 143, 153 (1995).
49. See John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face of Uncertainty, 26 URB. LAw. 327 (1994). In the late 1980s, environmental and land-use restrictions created growing anger in segments of the population who believed that the
new laws were unreasonably limiting their daily lives. A direct result of this antiregulatory sentiment was the emergence of a reactionary property rights movement
that "[a]t its core ... is railing against land-use laws, particularly those protecting
wetlands and endangered species, that it claims rob property owners of the full use
and value of their land." H. Jane Lehman, Private Property Rights Proponents Gain
Ground, WASH. PosT, Sept. 17, 1994, at El. This movement has been estimated to
consist of nearly 600 local property rights groups that have grown into a "powerful
force that is throwing its weight around in Washington, State capitols and the Courts
... [with the financial aid and support of] much wealthier and well established agriculture and industrial trade associations; lobbyists for large energy, mining and timber
companies and conservative public interest law firms .... "Keith Schneider, Fighting
to Keep U.S. Rules from Devaluing Land, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995, at A1, A12. This
approach has been initially successful at the state level. Since 1994, nearly 100 bills
addressing regulatory takings issues have been introduced in 37 states and legislation
has been enacted in Arizona, Utah, Delaware, Virginia, Indiana, Washington, Idaho,
and Mississippi. Defenders of Property Rights, 1 PROP. RTs. REP. 7 (Defenders of
Property Rights, Wash., D.C.) 1994. Most of these statutes require state agencies to
undertake extensive takings assessments of proposed laws and regulations, or require
the state's attorney general to evaluate the takings implications of proposed agency
rules. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 22-1A-1 to 22-1A-6 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-222-32, as amended by Pub. L. No. 34-1993, § 4; Pub. L. No. 12-1993, § 3 (1995). On the
federal level, in March 1995, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed
"The Private Property Protection Act of 1995." See discussion supra note 47.
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The State Courts as Instruments of Implementation of Federal
Constitutional Takings Doctrine

In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,50 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause claims were "self-executing," thus requiring compensation to
be paid whenever an unconstitutional taking was found to exist. However, it is not immediately apparent when.a particular land-use regulation, environmental regulation, or other governmental requirement
constitutes a "taking" in a constitutional law context. Fact situations
that closely resemble those actually considered in U.S. Supreme Court
cases are normally quite unusual. Therefore, the more general doctrinal points expressed in these decisions must be implemented in subsequent controversies on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the
constitutionality of a particular land-use control or other device must
be determined principally in a judicial forum.
Ambiguity, contextual application, a balancing of multiple factors,
and a general acceptance of a high degree of regulatory control have
been considered the hallmarks of the constitutional law doctrine in
the takings field. What happens when the Court appears to chart a
different course that is arguably more favorable to the interests of
landowners? How are the more recent constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court actually implemented by lower courts in
considering later cases? And, in this context, how do these Supreme
Court decisions change the way that state and local governments act
with regard to their authorized public health, safety, and environmental protection authorities? 51
The answer to these questions would seemingly be found in the
lower federal courts-a landowner's federal constitutional rights be50. 482 u.s. 304, 321 (1987).
51. Much of the answer to this question depends upon the clarity of the constitutional taking principle expressed by the Supreme Court, and also by the willingness of
governments to limit or abandon their regulatory objectives. At least three possible
reactions are likely. First, state and local governments can receive a clear understanding of the new constitutional norms from the Supreme Court's opinion and thereafter
make necessary regulatory and progranlffiatic adjustments to conform with the newly
articulated takings limits. In this scenario, state and local government regulators voluntarily acquiesce to the Supreme Court constitutional interpretation and its application to their specific cases.
Second, there can be an honest disagreement between government and landowners
over the meaning and application of new Supreme Court takings principles or their
application to individual cases. Litigated or negotiated resolutions of these conflicts
are the result, with the actual meaning of the takings· concepts being provided by the
deciding court or by the parties themselves as they compromise their conflicting
interests.
Third, there can be resistance to a clearly articulated, revised constitutional norm
with no governmental adjustment. This would apparently lead to judicial resolution
forcing governmental action to conform to the newly adopted takings limitation.
Such a course of action might have significant financial implications for a recalcitrant
government that refuses to voluntarily comply with the constitutional command.
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ing protected in federal court against governmental infringement.
However, as a result of a number of recent Supreme Court decisions,
claims of an as-applied regulatory taking violation by state and local
governments can reach the federal .court system in only a limited
number of situations. 52 Due to the doctrines of ripeness, finality, and
abstention,53 the lower federal courts are generally not available to
litigants seeking to establish that a particular regulation or programmatic requirement is an unconstitutional taking of private property. 54
Consequently, the state courts have become the primary interpreters
of the meaning and application of the new generation of Supreme
Court Fifth Amendment takings doctrine in the land-use and environmental protection areas.

52. Alleged federal government takings of private property can be brought initially in federal court by way of petition to the Federal Claims Court. However, the
bulk of takings situations arise through the application of state and local government
police or other sovereign power in the form of zoning, subdivision, natural resource,
or environmental protection regulation.
53. Over the past 15 years, the Supreme Court has issued an extensive series of
rulings ensuring that state courts first hear the federal takings claim and crystalize the
facts and nature of the issue. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), a
down-zoning takings claim was found by the Court not to be ripe since there had been
no submission of the development plan required by the locality's land-use control
ordinance. A year later, the Court reached a similar result in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & ReclamationAss'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). In San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), the Court applied a final judgment rule
to a situation in which the city adopted an open space plan and ordinance, but when
the utility landowner brought a state inverse condemnation action, which was dismissed, the Supreme Court held that the California state courts had not finally determined whether a taking had occurred.
The key decision.in this line of cases is Williamson County Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), which imposed two important requirements
upon taking claims: (1) the landowner must obtain a final decision regarding the use
of the property to make it known how severely the land-use regulation affects the
land, id. at 186, and (2) the landowner must seek compensation through adequate,
available state procedures, id. at 195, usually a state inverse condemnation action.
Fmally, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986), in a
denial of a land-use reclassification, the decision of the land-use regulatory agency
must be "final and authoritative" and it must describe the "type and intensity" of the
development legally permitted. Id. at 348. Collectively, these decisions direct takings
claims to the state courts and provide the grounds for federal courts to dismiss improperly filed cases.
54. See Thomas E. Roberts, Fifth Amendment Taking Claims in Federal Court: The
State Compensation Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata, 24 URB. LAw. 479
(1992); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of
Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land
Use Cases, 10 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 91 (1994). For a partial listing of federal
cases using a lack of ripeness as grounds for dismissal or avoidance of federal court
action, see 7 PATRICK J. RoHAN, ZoNING AND LAND UsE CoNTROLS § 52A-65 n.8
(1995).
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ANALYSIS OF STATE COURT DECISIONS APPLYING RECENT
UNITED STATES SuPREME CouRT TAKINGS CAsEs

With the understanding that the state courts provide the mandatory
first line of federal constitutional analysis, state decisions applying the
holdings in three prominent U.S. Supreme Court takings precedents-Dolan v. City of Tigard, 55 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 56 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 57 -were
researched and examined. The research method employed was to
search the LEXIS state law database for all decisions mentioning any
of the three cases and then to analyze both the manner in which the
state courts applied the Supreme Court case holdings and the results
of the state level adjudication. The time period covered by the research was from the date of each Supreme Court opinion (1987 for
Nollan, 1992 for Lucas, and 1994 for Dolan) up until January 15, 1995.
The result of the computerized search of the cases in all states provided a total of 192 cases mentioning Nollan, 80 cases referring to Lucas, and 19 cases citing Dolan. These totals decreased substantially
when state court cases merely citing, without discussing, one of the
three Supreme Court decisions had been discarded: 30 cases for Nollan, 57 for Lucas and 6 for Dolan.
The principal overall conclusion drawn from the research was that
there were surprisingly few reported decisions even mentioning the
prominent U.S. Supreme Court holdings in the three cases. Although
academic authors had analyzed, criticized, and harmonized these and
other takings opinions in hundreds of law review articles, the state
courts, at all levels, had given them far less attention and apparently
attached far less significance to them in reaching their own decisions.
A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
in this case, James and Marilyn NoUan owned a beachfront lot in
Ventura County, California located in close proximity to two public
beaches and recreation areas. 58 The Nollans' agreement to purchase
the lot had been conditioned upon their promise to demolish a small,
504-square-foot dilapidated bungalow situated on the lot and replace
it with a new structure. 59 To rebuild on the beachfront lot, the Nollans
were required under California law to obtain a coastal development
permit from the California Coastal Commission ("Commission"). 60
The Nollans applied for the necessary permit and were subsequently
informed that their permit request had been granted by the Commission subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

114 S.. Ct. 2309 (1994).
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
483 u.s. 825 (1987).
No/lan, 483 U.S. at 827.
ld. at 827-28.
ld. at 828.
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pass across the portion of their property bounded by the mean hightide line on one side and their backyard seawall on the other. 61 This
lateral access easement would make it easier for the public to traverse
the beach area behind the planned home and to reach the two public
parks about a quarter of a mile away. 62
The Nollans unsuccessfully protested the easement dedication
before the Commission, which reaffirmed its imposition of the condition.63 However; the state Superior Court ruled in favor of the Nollans based upon non-constitutional, statutory grounds that there was
insufficient factual evidence in the administrative record for concluding that the replacement of the old bungalow with the new house
would create a direct or cumulative burden on public access to the
sea. 64 The California Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, 65
ruling that (1) the California Coastal Act required such a "conditioned" permit for a building replacement, (2) the requirement was
constitutional as long as the project contributed, even indirectly, to
the need for public beach access, and (3) there had not been a taking
since the condition merely diminished the value of the Nollans' lot but
it did not deprive them of all reasonable use of their property. On
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Nollans raised only the constitutional issue.
In a five-to-four opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia ruled that the Commission's permit requiring the transfer of a lateral beach access easement was an unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation. Citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 66 Justice Scalia noted
the general propositionthat land-use regulation does not effect an unconstitutional taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not "deny an owner economically viable use of his
land." 67 Accepting the three princPsal justifications provided by California as legitimate state interests, 8 the majority concluded that the
61. /d.
62. /d.
63. Following a public hearing, the California Coastal Commission ("Commission") found that the Nollans' proposed new house would decrease the public's view
of the Pacific Ocean and contribute to the development of "a 'wall' of residential
structures" that would prevent the public "psychologically ... from realizing a stretch
of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit." /d. at 828-29. In addition, the state agency concluded that this private use of the beachfront, "along with
other area development, would cumulatively 'burden the public's ability to traverse to
and along the shorefront.' "/d. at 829 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 65-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)). In the Commission's view, this incremental impact could be properly offset by a permit condition requiring the transfer of
the lateral access easement. /d.
64. /d. at 829.
65. 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
66. 447 u.s. 255 (1980).
67. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
68. The opinion notes three main justifications given by the Commission. "The
Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are protecting the public's
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permit condition failed to demonstrate a reasonable relationship to
the otherwise valid state objectives identified in support of the easement requirement. 69 Justice Scalia noted that "this case does not meet
even the most untailored standards. "70
The Nollan decision is significant because it subjected a state program of beachfront development control to .careful scrutiny under a
linked or hybrid due process/takings standard of federal constitutional
review. Here, the Court closely examined California's land-use control practice to determine if it "substantially advance[d]" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved. This opinion, anticipating
the holding in Dolan by seven years, announced a more searching
form of judicial review when a land regulation allegedly affects a taking.71 It also suggested that a land-use regulation or exaction could be
considered an unconstitutional taking of property if, during judicial
review, a connection to a "legitimate state interest" was found to be
inadequate or absent. Justice Scalia certainly foresaw a more active,
less deferential role for the courts in testing the constitutionality of
future land-use and environmental protection practices.72
ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier'
to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on
the public beaches." /d. at 835.
·
69. The majority opinion suggests that the permit requirement would be unconstitutional if the condition "utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification
for the prohibition." /d. at 837. However close a fit is required by the "essential
nexus" standard articulated in this case, Justice Scalia found the justifications in Nottan to be sorely lacking. He wrote,
[i]t is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already
on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the
public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them
caused by construction of the Nollans' new house.
/d. at 838-39.
Furthermore, he suspected that the police power was being used illegitimately to
extort valuable property from landowners who needed developmental approvals. /d.
at 837 n.5. The use of regulatory approval as a de facto tax-raising device was not
considered a proper object of regulation, and clearly offended the Not/an majority,
which stated, "[wJhatever may be the outer limits of 'legitimate state interests' iQ the
takings and land-use contexts, this is not one of them." !d. at 837.
70. /d. at 838.
71. In footnote 3, Justice·scalia suggested a "heightened" form of scrutiny by reformulating the appropriate standard of review in takings cases. He stated that
there is no reason to believe ... that so long as the regulation of property is
at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and
equal protection challenges are identical; any more than there is any reason ·
to believe that so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the standards for
due process challenges, equal protection challenges, and First Amendment
challenges are identical.
/d. at 835 n.3.
·
72. Due to the ripeness and finality principles, discussed suwa notes 52-54 and
accompanying text, which vest primary consideration for federal constitutionality in
the state courts, the decision in Nollan linking due process and takings theories now
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The analysis of state court decisions mentioning Nollan yielded a
number of striking conclusions. The Supreme Court's holding,
although heralded by academic and practitioner authors alike, was little used by the state courts during the seven-and-a-half-year period.
Nollan was cited a total of 192 times during this period by all levels of
reported state decisions. However, this number shrunk to merely
thirty cases when the incidental citations to the Nollan case were discarded. Consequently, Nollan has been discussed in an average of less
than four cases per year in all of the states and at all court levels since
1987. 73 In some regions of the country, there was virtually no substantive discussion of the Nollan holding at all.74 The relative infrequency
of state court consideration of the Nollan holding casts doubt on the
assumption of the influential nature of this U.S. Supreme Court decision on state and local law. At least the statistical information indicates that Nollan rarely serves as the basis for the holdings of the
reviewing state courts.
An overview of the state decisions mentioning Nollan provides an
opportunity to sample the breadth and variety of legal questions
before the nation's state courts. The controversies examined by this
research cover such conventional zoning and land-use contexts as denied rezoning requests/5 minimum square footage requirements,76
effectively sends the initial due process arguments to the state courts. These courts
have been asked to determine whether varied forms of state and local government
land-use control and environmental protection actually do bear a substantial relationship to legitimate governmental interests. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of state case holdings during the last seven-and-a-half-years have found such a
relationship and have not found an unconstitutional taking of property. See discussion infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text. The state courts during this period
have refused to use the Nollan opinion in an expansive way to invalidate or penalize
general public health, safety, environmental, and land-use regulation.
73. The Nollan decision was rarely considered by state supreme courts over the
seven-and-one-half-year period, with a total of 14 decisions discussing the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in any detail. This is an average of less than two state decisions per year.
74. The regional patterns for state court discussion of Nollan from 1987 to 1995
are as follows:
Region
Number of Cases
1. Pacific Coast
11 cases
2. Southwestern
1 case
3. Mountain states
4 cases
4. Great Plains
1 case
5. Southeastern
1 case
6. Midwest
2 cases
7. Mid-Atlantic
6 cases
8. Northeast
4 cases
75. Cottonwood Farms v. Board of County Comm'rs, 763 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1988)
(citing Nollan specifically for its ruling that an owner who purchases property with
knowledge of applicable zoning regulations is not invariably prevented by the selfinflicted hardship doctrine from attacking the validity of those regulations as unconstitutional takings).
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and sidewalk77 and street dedication rules, 78 as well as a full range of
modern regulatory areas. These include challenges to fire safety
codes,79 archeological protection rules,80 farmland preservation
laws,81 nitrate ban ordinances,82 airport height regulations, 83 estuarine
sanctuary regulations,84 and sign ordinances. 85 The second major conclusion derived from this analysis is that state courts have rarely used
the Nollan precedent as grounds for the invalidation of a regulatory or
other program. In fact, only one state supreme court86 and four ap76. Builders Serv. Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 545 A.2d 530 (Conn.
1988) (plaintiff asserted that Nollan's holding required a building permit condition
"substantially advance a legitimate state purpose" and that it established a heightened
standard of review for both permit conditions and zoning regulations, which was rejected by the court in a land-use regulation case).
77. State v. Lundberg, 825 P.2d 641 (Or. 1992).
78. Paradyne Corp. v. State, 528 So. 2d 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding a
state transportation agency requirement that landowner build a driveway connecting
its land and that of a neighbor to the state road to be a taking without due process and
very similar to the lateral beach access easement in Nollan by failing the nexus test).
79. Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1990) (upholding the application of
a municipal fire code to an existing building against Nollan-based takings claim by
finding the code to advance the public interest and by refusing to compare the benefits of other safety approaches).
80. Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d 1000
(Ind. 1990) (upholding an agency refusal to grant a strip mining permit on a small part
of plaintiff's land that contained an archeologically sensitive site under Nollan because that case did not set a higher nexus standard and it applied only to cases in
which government is attempting to enforce actual conveyance of property).
81. Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991) (upholding severe restrictions on land use in an environmentally-sensitive region and distinguishing Nollan in that preserving undeveloped land is a legitimate public interest and
the Pinelands restrictions appropriately serve that interest).
82. Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah 1991) (remanding case in which an
ordinance banning nitrate use was attacked as a taking by allegedly reducing property
value by 85 to 90%, but finding Nollan to be inapplicable because it did not address
whether the owners were denied any economically viable uses of their land).
83. Rogers v. City of Cheyenne, 747 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1987) (upholding height limitations in airport ordinance and distinguishing Nollan because the beachfront access
easement did not bear nearly as strong a relationship to a demonstrable public interest as a regulation concerning the height of trees in an aircraft approach zone).
84. Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987).
85. Circle K Corp. v. City of Mesa, 803 P.2d 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding
an ordinance requiring the removal of a nonconforming sign as a condition for installing new conforming sign and finding a legitimate state interest in eliminating nonconforming signs).
86. In Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989), the New
York Court of Appeals struck down a New York City ordinance (1) prohibiting building owners from demolishing, altering, or converting single-room occupancy apartments and (2) requiring maintenance and repair of these properties for an indefinite
period and the leasing to tenants at controlled rents. Significant financial penaltiesas high as $150,000 per unit-could be imposed to enforce the ordinance. Property
owners could evade these requirements by paying the city a $45,000 "buyout" contribution. Judge Hancock concluded that the law was an "unconstitutional confiscation
of the owner's property" and that it violated the takings provisions of both the federal
and the New York Constitutions.
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pellate courts87 in more than seven years have relied on Nollan to
strike down a local initiative. The state court cases overwhelmingly
uphold government regulatory and other programs when they are
challenged as being inconsistent with the principles set forth in Nollan.
Landowners lose these cases. When the Nollan precedent is applied,
courts will often limit its application to situations in which the government acquires property rights without giving compensation and not to
cases of use regulation. This is significant since most cases challenge
use restrictions and do'not involve exactions. In addition, some state
courts will refer to Nollan's "nexus" requirement as imposing a higher
degree of correlation between the governmental objectives and the
burden imposed on property owners. 88 Most decisions consider this
issue but easily find that local regulations meet a rational basis due
process test. Some courts simply refuse to apply Nollan to cases of
direct land-use regulation, reserving it exclusively for property exaction situations. 89 Ultimately, Nollan appears to have had less of an
impact than would have been expected.
Much of the court's discussion focused upon federal cases with major consideration
of the Nollan opinion. The New York court found that the SRO ordinance worked a
per se physical taking-equal to the lateral access easement required in Nol/an-in
that it denied the owners the power to exclude tenants in the future. Ruling on a
separate basis, Judge Hancock held that the ordinance failed the nexus test from Nollan in that the stated goal of reducing homelessness would not be substantially advanced by the law. It found that there was no "close nexus" between the burdens
imposed upon the property owners and the improvement of homelessness conditions,
that any relationship was "indirect at best and conjectural." Id. at 1069. Central to
the court's view of the New York City ordinance was the $45,000 "buyout" provision
that appeared to impose a selective tax upon building owners and thus sihgled them
out for disparate treatment.
87. Colony Cove Ass'n v. City of Carson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(mobile home rent control ordinance); Surfside Colony Ltd. v. California Coastal
Comm'n, No. G007940, 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 132 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1991}
(struck seawall permit conditioned upon public lateral beach access given by property
owner since there was no substantial nexus between the public access condition and
the seawall permit); Rohn v. City of Visalia, 263 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(struck rezoning condition requiring landowner to dedicate 14% of its property to
correct a street alignment problem by concluding that the condition bears no relationship, either direct or indirect, to the present or future use of the property); Paradyne
Corp. v. State, 528 So. 2d 921 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (required driveway improvement
serving neighboring land fails nexus and per se physical takings tests).
88. The emphasis usually originates in the Supreme Court's language in Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980}, creating a two prong test for taking claims: (1)
whether the regulation substantially advances legitimate state interests, and (2)
whether it denies the owner economically viable use of his land. The examination of
the first prong of the Agins test with the enhanced emphasis placed on judicial review
by Justice Scalia in Nollan. has led some state courts to speak of imposing a higher
degree of nexus, yet ultimately finding that the new benchmark has been met. See,
e.g., Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind.
1989}. Most cases, however, easily find that the required relationship exists without
any discussion of a tougher level of scrutiny or a higher degree of correlation. See,
e.g., Rogers v. City of Cheyenne, 747 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1987).
89. Builders Serv. Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 545 A.2d 530 (Conn.
1988).
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council

In 1992, the Supreme Court decided the much-heralded case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 90 which announced a new cate.:
gorical rule for cases of total deprivation of all economically viable
land usage. 91 In 1986, David Lucas purchased two residential building
lots in a subdivision on the Isle of Palms barrier island in Charleston
County, South Carolina. 92 At that time, the land was properly zoned
for residential construction. 93 He paid $975;000 for both parcels. 94
Two years later, in 1988, the .South Carolina Legislature enacted the
BeachfroQ.t Management Act ("Act"),95 which had the direct effect of
barring Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on
the two lots. 96 Consequently, .Lucas filed suit in state court, contending that the Act's complete extinguishment of his property's value entitled him to compensation. 97
The trial court found that the Act "deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots, ... eliminated the unrestricted right of
use, and render[ed] them valueless." 98 It then decided that Lucas' lots
had been "taken" by the operation of the Act, and ordered the state
to pay Lucas $1.2 million. 99 On appeal, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina reversed, ruling tqat when a regulation respecting the use of
property is designed " 'to prevent serious public harm,' . . . no compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation's effect on the property's value." 100
The U.S. Supreme Court, brushing aside a ripeness defense, 101 reversed the state supreme court. 102 Justice Scalia, writing for a fiveJustice majority, reviewed the federal takings jurisprudence and concluded that the Court had identified two "discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the
90. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
91. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. ld. at 2889.
93. ld.
94. ld.
95. S.C. CooE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
96. The Beachfront Management Act ("Act") did permit the construction of a
number of nonhabitable improvements including wooden walkways no larger in width
than six feet and small wooden decks no larger than 144 square feet. Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
at 2890 n.2.
97. ld. at 2890.
98. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 37).
99. ld.
100. ld. (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899
(S.C. 1991)). 1\vo justices of the Supreme Court of South Carolina dissented, holding
that the chief purpose of the Act was not the avoidance of "noxious" use or public
nuisances but rather the promotion of tourism and the creation of plant and animal
habitat. The lesser legislative objective, in their view, did not justify, in constitutional
terms, the Act's obliteration of Lucas's property value. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 906.
101. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890-92.
102. ld. at 2902.
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public interest advanced in support of the restraint." 103 The first category is physical invasions of private property, 104 and the second is
"where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land." 105 This second prong of the categorical takings law was the
subject of Lucas. The suggestion of this part of the opinion was that
severe regulations, "sacrific[in§] all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good," 1 6 impose an unconstitutional taking of
property regardless of the harm to be prevented by the regulation. 107
Backing off from that extreme position on the validity of new regulation, Justice Scalia admitted that a severe land-use limitation prohibiting all economically beneficial use of land could be upheld in certain
situations. 108 He wrote, "[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. " 109
With these words, the majority opinion left open numerous questions
concerning the meaning of the opinion, and actually reinforced the
possibility of upholding sweeping land-use controls or prohibitions
that might be imposed through either private or public nuisance actions "or otherwise.' 0110 In the end, the Lucas case was remanded
back to the South Carolina courts with a challenge to identify those
"background principles of nuisance and property law that would prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the
property is presently found.'' 111 While David Lucas ultimately re103. Id. at 2893.
104. The principal examples given involved requiring the installation of cable lines
on apartment buildings, physical invasions of airspace, and the imposition of navigational servitudes upon a private marina. ld.
105. Jd.
106. Jd. at 2895.
107. Justice Scalia cast a skeptical glance at the "harm-preventing" and "benefitconferring" distinction as a means of justifying severe forms of land use or other regulation. He concluded that the actual difference was "often in the eye of the beholder," Id. at 2897, and that "[a] given restraint will be seen as mitigating 'harm' to
the adjacent parcels or securing a 'benefit' for them, depending upon the observer's
evaluation of the relative importance of the use that the restraint favors." I d. at 2898.
108. Id. at 2899-2902.
109. Id. at 2900.
110. Jd. The "or otherwise" quote was amplified by a footnote that recognized the
power of state or local government, or even private parties, to destroy private property in cases of actual necessity or "to forestall other grave threats to the lives and
property of others." Jd. at 2900 n.16.
111. Id. at 2901-02. At the conclusion of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized a great skepticism for state legislative declarations of state law and public
policy. Anticipating the Dolan holding by two years, he wrote that the state must
show clearly the pre-existing nuisance or property law that would justify a regulatory
prohibition on land use.. To emphasize the point, Justice Scalia stressed that,
an affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be
defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents
would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is
presently found.
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ceived ample compensation for the two building lots, 112 scholars have
continued to debate the significance of the holding.l1 3
The review of the state court opinions in the two-and-one-half-year
period following the Lucas decision revealed a total of eighty cases
mentioning Lucas, only fifty-seven of which considered its holding in
any detailed fashion. Even though it is rarely determinative of the
outcome, Lucas has been mentioned in a wide variety of factual settings, including rent control; quarry regulation, permit denials for
small lots, sea wall construction, wetland and floodplain building, and
conditional use permit cases. 114 In all of the eighty state cases examined, only three can be said to have relied on Lucas in finding a
regulatory taking. 115 A small number of decisions remand the contro!d. at 2902 n.18. Apparently, legislative statements of purpose would not be sufficient; some greater indication of support in state property or tort law would be
needed. Curiously, in more recent cases, Justice Scalia has objected to federal courts
accepting state law definitions of "background property rights" that would determine
whether a per se taking has occurred. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct.
1332 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from a denial of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Oregon).
112. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously found that there
was no common-law basis for restricting the planned construction on the Lucas parcels, and transferred the case to the circuit court to determine "the actual damages
Lucas has sustained as the result of his being temporarily deprived of the use of his
property." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
The case eventually ended in a negotiated settlement whereby the State of South
Carolina paid Lucas $850,000 for the two lots plus $725,000 in interest, attorney's fees,
and costs, totalling $1.575 million. South Carolina then resold the lots to a construction company for only $785,000, thereby realizing a loss of nearly $800,000 on the
complete transaction.
113. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1411 (1993); David Coursen, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council· Indirection in the Evolution of Takings Law, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,778
(1992).
114. Litigants have discovered the regulatory takings theory and are employing it in
novel situations. For example, in Carter v. City of Porterville, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993), a landowner sued the city for the negligent construction of a
dam that had the potential to collapse. The plaintiff landowner alleged that this danger represented a regulatory taking because the city's actions had endangered his land
and thereby had made it valueless. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff but the
California Court of Appeal reversed, granting the city a specified amount of time to
repair the dam, after which a regulatory taking would occur. !d. at 87.
115. In Moroney v. Mayor & City Council, 633 A.2d 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993), landowners instituted an inverse condemnation suit when they were denied a hardship variance to build a house on an undersized lot. The court determined
that the denial of permission to build the home deprived the owners of "all productive
or beneficial use" of the land and it analogized the permit denial to an actual physical
invasion of the land. !d. at 1050. Despite the ordinance having existed prior to the
landowner's purchase, the court found that this owner did have reasonable investment-backed expectations and that all of its beneficial economic use had been deprived. /d. at 1049.
People ex rei. Department of Transp. v. Diversified Properties Co. III, 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), involved a developer who purchased land for use as a
commercial center with knowledge that a portion of the land was to serve as a right of
way for a highway. /d. at 678. The city blocked development pending the finalization
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versy to the lower courts for a Lucas determination of whether the
nuisance exception applies or whether there is any economically viable use left for the property. In several other cases, takings were held
to have occurred, but exclusively under state constitutions.U 6
The clearest conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the vast majority of the cases citing Lucas do not find a regulatory taking nor a
physical occupation taking. During the two-and-one-half-year period
following the Supreme Court's decision, the state courts have not used
the decision as a vehicle for massive interference with state and local
government land-use and environmental regulatory programs. In fact,
it is surprising how little effect this high profile takings case has had in
actual controversies litigated in all of the state courts.
The reactions of the courts that have interpreted and applied the
Lucas precedent are varied. Cases usually only mention Lucas in
passing as part of a general discussion of federal takings jurisprudence.U7 It is actually cited frequently, not for its own content or
of the state's highway plans. ld. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that a taking had occurred because the state had effectively "banked" the property so it could buy it years later when it was actually needed. ld. at 688. The
temporary banking took place without any payment to the landowner. ld. at 679.
Finally, in The Mill v. State, 868 P.2d 1099 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), the plaintiff
owned an area formerly used as a uranium mill tailings disposal site and leased it, at a
rental of $7000 per month, for use as a coal storage facility. /d. at 1103. Due to state
restrictions, this use was barred and the property's rental value plummeted to $500700 per month. ld. The court held that the restrictions on use amounted to a regulatory taking. Id. at 1109. Lucas was cited for the proposition that a regulation
amounts to an unconstitutional taking when it extinguishes all or virtually all of a
property's economic attributes. ld. The 90% reduction in rental value met this standard. ld. at 1110. The court, however, did not discuss the nuisance or background
property concept exceptions to the Lucas policy.
116. The case of Powers v. Skagit County, 835 P.2d 230 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), is a
good example of the small number of cases that remand a controversy to the trial
court for a determination of (1) whether the regulation in question strips property of
all economically viable use or (2) whether the restriction is one that background principles of state property and nuisance law already place on ownership. This appellate
court considered these to be material issues of fact that were unresolved by the lower
court. Id. at 190-91. See also Wheeler v. City of Wayzata, 511 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994); Tim Thompson, Inc. v. Village of Hinsdale, 617 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
As for holdings finding a taking under state law, see Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of
Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 401 (Neb. 1994); Layne v. City of Mandeville, 633 So. 2d 608
(La. Ct. App. 1994); Rivet v. Department of Transp., 635 So. 2d 295 (La. Ct. App.
.
1994).
117. Cannone v. Noey, 867 P.2d 797 (Alaska 1994) (holding Lucas not to apply
because the landowner's property was not made valueless by the state's action);
Anchorage v. Sandberg; 861 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1993) (same); Tensor Group v. City of
Glendale, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (mentioning Lucas in passing);
City & County of San Francisco v, Golden Gate Heights Invs., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding property not to have lost av, ecpnomic value); Ehrlich v.
City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding land not to have
been rendered valueless by restrictions existing when the property was purchased);
Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing, in general terms, the state's power to
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ideas, but rather, as a short-hand way of setting forth constitutional
principles derived from the Agins, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 118 and Penn Central decisionsY 9 Sometimes Lucas is
merely relegated to a minor reference in a footnote. 120
· When opinions do, in fact, discuss the Lucas holding, they usually
emphasize the categorical language of the opinion defining an unconstitutional taking as occurring when a regulation "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land." 121 While the state
courts cite this portion of the Supreme Court's decision, they rarely
find the constitutionally-forbidden condition to exist. Other cases
mention Lucas but refuse to undertake any takings analysis due to a
lack of ripeness, finality, or exhaustion of administrative remedies. 122
regulate property); Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe City, 494 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa
1993) (no total deprivation of economic value with a rezoning use change); Ward v.
Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) (citing Lucas for the proposition that regulatory
action may diminish or eliminate certain land uses so long as it does not destroy all
permissible uses); Jones v. King County, 874 P.2d 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that down-zoning did not deny all economically viable use and did not destroy any
fundamental property right).
118. 458 u.s. 419 (1982).
119. See Peters v. Milks Grove Special Drainage Dist. No. 1, 610 N.E.2d 1385
(1993) (citing Lucas as part of the court's discussion of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), and its rule for permanent, physical invasions); Fitzgarrald v. City of Iowa City, 492 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa 1992) (same); Ferguson
v. City of Mill City, 852 P.2d 205 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding a government action
that effects a permanent physical occupation to be a taking).
120. See Zerbertz v. Municipality of Anchorage, 856 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1993); City
of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175 (Colq. 1993); Forsythe County v. Greer, 439
S.E.2d 679 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); National Resources & Envtl. Protection Cabinet v.
Kentuck Harlan Coal Co., 870 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
121. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). The
cases also frequently cite the sinlilar quote that "when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."
Id. at 2895.
In some cases, the state courts analyze the facts so as not to find a total elimination
of use. For example, in Ramona Convent of tlle Holy Names v. City of Alhambra, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), the court, under a Lucas analysis, found no
taking when 10% of a 19-acre parcel had been designated "open space" and made
unbuildable by the zoning regulation. Id. at 147. The court concluded that the landowner did not lose all economically viable use of its property since the city's designation diminished the value of the entire 19-acre parcel, but it did not prohibit its total
use. !d. The wholistic concept of the property right at issue saved the open space
zoning from the takings attack.
122. See Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (mentioning the Lucas test, but deferring the case on ripeness grounds); Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994) (requiring a
landowner to pursue administrative remedies prior to receivingjudicial review of the
taking claim); Galbraith v. Planning Dep't of Anderson, 627 N.E.2d 850 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding judicial review to be premature because administrative remedies
were not exhausted); Kudloff v. City of Billings, 860 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1993) (same);
Wheeler v. City of Wayzata, 511 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the
owner's claim was not ripe); Joyce v. Multnomah County, 835 P.2d 127 (Or. Ct. App.
1992) (defining ripeness).
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Finally, Lucas receives narrow interpretation by many state courts,
which conclude that certain kinds of government actions-e.g., permitting delays 123 and development moratoria-do not fall subject to
its command. 124 Some courts do not give Lucas any effect, stating
either that the Supreme Court's holding did not change preexisting
law, that state (not federal) law applies, or that the regulation at issue
fits within Justice Scalia's exception for nuisances and customary
property rights.l2 5 The end result of this review indicates that the Lucas decision has not had a major impact on the state courts and has
not resulted in more than a trivial number of constitutional invalidations of state and local regulations.
C. Dolan

v. City of Tigard

This case involved Florence Dolan's plans to expand her hardware
business in Tigard, Oregon. 126 The City of Tigard had adopted a comprehensive plan that noted that flooding had occurred at Fanno Creek
near Dolan's property. 127 The plan recommended a number of improvements to the creek basin and also suggested that the floodplain
be kept free of structures and preserved as a greenway to limit flood
damage. 128 Tigard had adopted a plan for building a pedestrian/bicycle path to provide an alternative to automobile use and requiring development in the central business district to dedicate land for the
path. 129 The Dolans owned a family hardware store on a 1.67 acre
parcel and, consistent with the Tigard's zoning ordinance, planned to
replace the existing structure with a 17,600-square-foot store to be
built on the western side of the lot. 130 The new structure would
double the size of the existing building and would require paving an
area to accommodate a thirty-nine space parking lot. 131 Tigard's planning commission approved construction of the store building but it
123. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1992) (holding that Lucas
does not apply to a delay in the administrative process for approval to build a protective wall).
124. Another category of state cases rejects the regulatory takings theory on
grounds that the landowner bought the parcel knowing of its regulatory limitations.
See, e.g., Community of Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Township Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 613 N.E.2d 580 (Ohio 1993).
125. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 1992),
aff'd, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994) (holding that denial
of permission to build sea wall near beach did not take property interests because
state customary law recognized public beach access rights long before landowner
purchased).
126. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision recites most of the essential facts about the
case. See 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). See also L. Watters, Dolan v. City of Tigard· Introduction and Decision, 25 ENVTL. L. 111 (1995).
127. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2313 (1994).
128. /d.
129. /d.
130. /d.
131. /d.
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added conditions requiring the Dolans to remove a roof si§n and dedicate land for a greenway and a pedestrian/bicycle path. 1 2 The land
dedication requirement totalled about 7000 square feet of the lot or
about ten percent of its area. 133
Dolan appealed the planning commission's decision to the Oregon
Land Use Board of Appeals ("LUBA") which upheld the two dedication requirements by finding that a "reasonable relationship" existed
between the impact of the proposed development and both land contributions.134 The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed LUBA's conclusions that the correct test to be applied in this case was the Oregon
precedent requiring a "reasonable relationship" between developmental impact and the conditions that may be attached. 135 The Oregon Supreme Court concurred,136 concluding that the "reasonable
relationship" test was not abandoned by the Court in Nollan and that
the conditions imposed on the Dolans bore an essential nexus to the
site and the proposed building. 137
Once again, a five-to-four .decision of the Supreme Court considered the development exactions and ruled that the Oregon practice
violated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. 138 Writing for the
majority,l 39 Chief Justice Rehnquist held that although the Nollan
case required an "essential nexus" between the permit condition and a
legitimate state interest, such a connection existed here with regard to
the rurposes of flood control and the reduction of traffic congestion. 40 The real import of the decision was its discussion of the required relationship between the cit.X's conditions and the impact of the
proposed redevelopment project. 1 1 For Fifth Amendment purposes,
132. ld. at 2314. See 20 Or. LUBA 411, 413 (1991).
133. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
134. 20 Or. LUBA 411 (1991); 22 Or. LUBA 617 (1992).
135. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853, 855 (1992).
The Court of Appeals held that prior Oregon decisions had adopted this test under
the Oregon Constitution as defined in prior state decisions. 832 P.2d at 355; see
Hayes v. City of Albany, 490 P.2d 1018 (Or. Ct. App. 1971). The court also relied on
a recent Ninth Circuit opinion interpreting the requirements of the Flfth Amendment
of the federal Constitution as supporting the same result. 832 P.2d at 355; see Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1997 (1992).
136. 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
137. ld. at 443.
138. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
139. The majority in Dolan was composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.
140. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
141. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated this proposition in the following fashion,
[T]he second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bear the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed
development.
!d. at 2318. Due to their greater experience with this area of law, the Court examined
the tests enunciated in state court opinions across the nation. !d. at 2318-19. These

550 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VI

the city's exactions must bear a "rough proportionality" to the impact
of the proposed project. 142 The implicit meaning of this relational test
is that any exaction or dedication not bearing such a rough proportionality would violate the Takings Clause and consequently be
unconstitutional. 143
In addition to announcing this new constitutional standard, Chief
Justice Rehnquist also insisted that municipalities make "some sort of
individualized determination that the required. dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. " 144 Within the context of the controversy at issue in Dolan, the
Court found that the city had failed to demonstrate the required reasonable relationship for either the floodplain easement or the pedestrian/bicycle pathway. 145 While it may be argued that the significance
of the Dolan holding is limited to the specific circumstances of the
case-an individual adjudicative determination and the required
transfer of property to the city-the case is undoubtedly an attack
upon the general support accorded government land-use control programs and their usual presumptive constitutionality. 146 At the very
least, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion suggests the need for new governmental procedures designed to ·more accurately measure individual
decisions ranged from the "very generalized statements" (supporting exactions in
New York and Montana), id., to the "reasonable relationship test"(an intermediate
position in Nebraska), to the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test (limiting
exactions in Illinois). !d. at 2319. In a conclusory fashion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that the "reasonable relationship" test "is closer to the federal constitutional
norm than those previously discussed." Id. However, because the term "reasonable
relationship" was "confusingly similar" to the low-level due process/equal protection
scrutiny required under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court chose to adopt a new,
and possibly more demanding, test termed "rough proportionality." Id. By avoiding
"confusion" with the low-level rational basis due process test, the majority also managed to shift the burden of proving the existence of the required relationship from the
challenging landowner to the defending municipality. Id. at 2320. Both dissenting
opinions objected to this change in the prevailing constitutional law principles. /d. at
2329-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2319.
143. Id. at 2319-20.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2322.
146. Some commentators have minimized the impact of Dolan in their analyses.
For instance, Professor William Funk has written that,
[T]he thrust of my analysis has been to minimize the effect of Dolan. This is
not just wishful thinking; it is the clear tenor of the decision itself. The terms
of the decision distinguish the conditions in Dolan from ordinary land use
regulation, both by reason of the dedications of property and the preconceived conditions before· any development was planned. Even when the Dolan decision is applicable, the Court's rough proportionality test, both by its
terms and as suggested by the Court's analysis of Tigard's conditions, is not
particularly demanding. And finally, Dolan will be mediated through state
courts that are likely to make minimal changes to existing practices and
understandings.
William Funk, Reading Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 ENVTL. L. 127, 141 (1995) (emphasis added). It is this final prediction that is the main focus of this Essay.
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development impacts and to assign more proportional landowner
burdens.
Reviewing the state court reception of the Dolan decision in the
seven-month period following its announcement reveals the following
patterns. Dolan was cited in a total of nineteen reported cases from
June 24, 1994 through January 15, 1995. 147 Of the nineteen, only four
decisions-two each in state supreme courts and appellate courtscontained any substantive discussion of Dolan} 48 Courts often found
reasons to cite Dolan without using it as a basis for decision in the
cases before them. For instance, in Waters Landing Ltd. Partnership v.
Montgomery County, 149 the Maryland Court of Appeals considered
the lawfulness of a county's retroactive imposition of a development
impact fee authorized under state law. In approving the practice, the
court explicitly rejected, as irrelevant, the application of Dolan since
the Maryland practice at issue was a general legislative enactment and
it did not require the landowner to deed portions of land to the government.150 In this way, Dolan was confined to cases presenting land
exaction conditions. Along similar lines, the Washington Supreme
Court upheld a park and open space development fee requirement as
being "reasonably necessary as a direct result of ... proposed development"151 and then cited Dolan, almost as if it were an afterthought,
for the "rough proportionality" principle. 152 In other recent cases,
147. Of the reported cases citing Dolan, eight were in the state supreme courts, 10
were in the state appellate courts, and one was in state trial court.
148. The cases that were discarded usually failed to have anything but a brief citation to the Dolan decision. Sometimes these cases cited Dolan for a fundamental and
general constitutional law principle. See, e.g., Illinois State Toll Highway Auth. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 642 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 1994) (the Fifth Amendment is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). Other decisions cited
Dolan, quoting a sentence from the case without using it to decide the matter before
the court. See, e.g., Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994) (paraphrasing the principle that an individualized assessment of development impact and its relation to a legitimate state interest is necessary in a taking analysis); State v.
Heckman, 644 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Dolan's rough proportionality language); Francis 0. Day Co. v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 303
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (recognizing that a requirement placed upon a developer
to address needs beyond those generated by the specific development "may run afoul
of 'takings' jurisprudence"); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187 (Wash.
1994) (citing the "rough proportionality" test); Luxembourg Group, Inc. v. Snohmish
County, 887 P.2d 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (referring to the "rough proportionality"
requirement in a footnote).
149. 650 A.2d 712 (Md. 1994).
150. /d. at 724. The Court of Appeals also bel,ieved that the Takings Clause of the
U.S. Constitution did not apply to the facts of the case because the development fee
or tax did not constitute a regulatory taking since it did not deny all economically
beneficial or productive use of land or require a physical invasion of property. /d. In
the court's view, the fee being imposed by the county did not have either of these
regulatory effects. /d.
151. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994).
152. /d. at 194.
·
·
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Dolan has materialized merely as a passing reference in dissenting
opinions 153 or as being inapplicable. 154
The Dolan precedent ha& appeared in a small number of recent
state court decisions. In Peterman v. State Department of Natural Resources,155 landowners sued the state, on constitutional takings and
trespass theories, for the destruction through erosion of part of their
beachfront property resulting !rom the state's improper construction
of a boat launch and jetties. Within the unusual context of the case,
the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the state's power to make
navigational improvements without compensating private property
owners was limited. The. court recognized the traditional support accorded the state in managing the state's waterways but it noted that
"[T]he [uncompensated] loss of the property must be necessary or
possess an essential nexus to the navigational improvement in question."156 Justice Kallman gave Dolan an expansive reading, applying
it and constitutional protection to situations in which the state's waterway management activities exceeded their legitimate public purposes.157 In this way, the Michigan court found a constitutional-not
tort-based-landowner's right to be free from physically damaging
state conduct and effectively used the Dolan holding as punishment
for taking harmful action without serving the public interest.
The most striking adoption of the principles articulated by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Dolan has occurred in the appellate courts in Oregon following the Supreme Court's decision. Two recent cases,
Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 158 and J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas
153. In Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994),
the majority of the Georgia Supreme Court upheld Atlanta's zoning ordinance, which
required minimum barrier curbs and landscaping areas, ground cover, and trees for
downtown and midtown commercial development. /d. at 203. The court applied a
traditional and highly deferential Georgia due process standard of review that placed
the burden of proof on the challenger. Id. at 202; see Gradous v. Board of Comm'rs,
349 S.E.2d 707, 709"10 (1986). The dissenting justices, however, argued against the
prevailing Gradous test using a reference to the Dolan case in support of a new test,
called the "benefit-extraction" test. /d. at 204 (Sears, J., dissenting).
154. In Third & Catalina Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 895 P.2d 115 (Ariz. App. Div.
1 Aug. 18, 1994), a sprinkler retrofit ordinance was unsuccessfully challenged, and
Dolan was held to be inapposite since the ordinance was for the protection of public
health and safety and not for the acquisition of private property. The appellate court
strongly supported the city's action and stated,
The City may legitimately exercise its police power by requiring existing
buildings used for human habitation to meet reasonable health and safety
standards in order to protect the occupants. Private property may even be
destroyed by a City without compensation to the owner when the destruction is necessary to protect the public.
Id. at 120.
155. 521 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1994).
156. ld. at 512.
157. /d. at 514-15.
158. 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
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County, 159 presented similar issues concerning the imposition of conditions in exchange for granting regulatory permission for proposed
land-use changes. In Schultz, the landowners sought a development
permit allowing them to partition their 3.85-acre parcel into two building lots. Approval was granted subject to several conditions, including
the transfer of a ten-foot right-of-way along the length of the two parcels and other roadway dedications. 160 On the other hand, J. C. Reeves
involved a request to subdivide a 4.9-acre parcel into twenty-one
building lots, approval of which was conditioned upon the landowner's construction of street improvements along the portion of a
road abutting the parcel. 161
In Schultz, the principal landowner complaint was that the city required the dedication of extensive portions of their property for roadwidening in violation of the "rough proportionality" requirement of
Dolan. 162 The appellate court examined the record developed by
Grants Pass and concluded that it did not support the contention that
the exaction was "related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development." 163 The analysis was significant in two respects. First, the Oregon court rejected the argument that since the
road dedications were required by general city ordinances, they were
legislative decisions, and consequently not subject to the stringent demands of Dolan. The Schultz court ignored the method but rather
focused upon the nature of exaction-a land dedication-to distinguish it from a generally applicable use restriction that would be entitled to a presumption of validity. 164 A state court wishing to apply
Dolan expansively can follow Schultz and apply the heightened scrutiny to all land exactions whether imposed by general ordinance or by
specific adjudicatory procedure.
Second, and more importantly, the Schultz case represents intrusive
judicial review and second-guessing of a municipal process and developmental policy. The court took special offense to the city's technique
of assessing the landowner's dedication responsibility in terms of the
potential development of the partitioned tract rather than the actual
proposed use of the parcel. 165 Placed in this context, the city's road
dedication requirement appeared excessive and insufficiently related
159. 887 P.2d 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
160. Schultz, 884 P.2d at 570.
161. J.C. Reeves, 887 P.2d at 360.
162. Schultz, 884 P.2d at 572. The landowner argued that there was "absolutely no
relationship between the impacts of their proposed development and the imposition
of the dedication requirement." Id.
163. /d. at 573 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994)).
164. Id.
165. The parcel in question contained a total of 3.85 acres and within the existing
zoning district could accommodate up to 20 homesites of a permissible 8000 square
feet per lot. ld. at 571. The city designed its highway dedication requirements based
upon the transportation impact of this maximum development potential rather than
the impact of the actual two-lot proposal. Id. at 573.
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to the transportation impact reasonably caused by a less intensive use
of the parcel. 166 Was the city trying to impose general city-wide transportation expenses upon one unfortunate landowner? Or was the city
correct in projecting the traffic impacts of the most intensive, "worst
case" example of permissible development? Within the meaning of
Dolan, the Oregon court believed that the city had failed to establish
the required connection between the land dedication condition and
the harm to be caused by the proposed deveJopment.
In the J.C. Reeves case, decided a month after Schultz, the court
also considered the validity of roadway land dedications required as a
condition of developmental approval. The appellate court read Dolan
to impose three new requirements: (1) the "rough proportionality"
standard, (2) the allocation to government of the burden of showing
Fifth Amendment compliance, and (3) the need for specific governmental findings supporting the exaction. With this interpretation of
Dolan, the appellate court proceeded to evaluate, and reject, the
county's determination of tqe subdivision-generated traffic and the
need for the dedication. 167 The J. C. Reeves holding invalidates land
transfer conditions that are not the result of a particularized impact
assessment. Consistent with Schultz, a local government reference to
a general requirement of the zoning ordinance as justifying the exaction was found to be insufficient.
If these two Oregon cases represent a trend in state court interpretation of Dolan, municipal exaction requirements will have to be individually customized following a judicially reviewable and defensible
local government procedure. State and local g·overnments will have to
develop impact assessment processes that will produce defensible
records of decision justifying a particular real property or cash exaction. Although mathematical precision has not been required by the
Supreme Court, reviewing judges will be asked to give meaning to the
constitutional concept of "rough proportionality" in individualized
cases. General ordinance provisions assessing generic requirements
on land development will be at least suspect and they will apparently
not be satisfactory without careful tailoring to the impact of particular
cases. Since Dolan represents the most recent Supreme Court takings
decision, more time will be needed to determine the full impact of its
holding.

166. The court was convinced that the landowners were being unfairly treated by
the city and that the municipality had not convincingly established its case for the
larger exaction. /d. at 572-73. "There is absolutely nothing in the record to connect
the dedication of a substantial portion of petitioner's land, for the purpose of widening city streets, with petitioner's limited application." /d. at 573.
167. J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360, 363-66 (Or. Ct. App.
1994).
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CoNCLUSION

The analysis of the aftermath of the Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court reveals a number of significant insights concerning the actual implementation of Supreme Court
constitutional doctrine. First, this research has reinforced the oftenoverlooked point that U.S. Supreme Court decisions are not self-executing. Commonly, Supreme Court holdings project a "symbolic" or
media-created meaning that is at' odds with the reality of litigation
results. It is important to examine tlte application of Supreme Court
principles in subsequent cases to understand, in a realistic way, the
state of the law, and ultimately, the impact of the Supreme Court.
Due to the special features· of the regulatory takings area, constitutional doctrine must take its life and receive its meaning from the decisions of the state and not the federal courts. Consequently, while
the Supreme Court may choose to announce broad or narrow points
of federal constitutional policy, the state courts ultimately have the
power to form the law by their judgments in individual cases.
Second, state courts apparently feel obliged to consider federal constitutional law in their rulings in regulatory takings cases. However,
these panels mention U.S. Supreme Court decisions much more than
they actually rely on them to justify specific case decisions. The vast
majority of state cases often make trivial, passing references to the
Supreme Court holdings under consideration in this research. ·When
the takings theory is applied by the state courts, it is generally confined, not expanded, by the reviewing judges. The U.S. Supreme
Court's doctrine has not been ignored by the state courts, but it generally has not been utilized as a basis for limiting community and state
land-use and environmental regulation. The state courts give the impression that they have a strong interest in "managing" their jurisdictions without significant intrusion and interference by federal
constitutional principles. This desire for state autonomy exists within
the American system of federal constitutional supremacy and probably reflects the reality of a system of law largely implemented by the
state courts.
Third, the three Supreme Court decisions under review have had
less of an impact on the outcome of individual controversies than one
may have expected. There has certainly been no rush to conservative
economiC constitutionalism across the country as an outgrowth of the
Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan decisions. At le::tst in this area of law, the
Supreme Court and its increasingly pro-landowner ideology has not
filtered down to control the outcome. in individual cases. The statistical information derived from this research indicates that landowners
have not been successful at using the state courts to limit restrictive
regulation. In fact, the government overwhelmingly wins litigation.
While the federal Supreme Court decisions might possibly be having
subtle effects on the judgment and policies of state and local govern-
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ment regulators, they are clearly not influencing state court judges to
tilt their discretion toward property owners' interests. In the end, the
realities of state litigation show judicial review not to be a fruitful pursuit for "over-regulated" landowners. Perhaps this explains the recent
upsurge of interest at all levels of government in effecting legislative
change to protect property owners' interests. Maybe it is the ineffectiveness of the Supreme Court to serve as an agent of change in the
regulatory takings field that has led this debate from the courts to the
legislatures-from the judicial forum to the purely political arena.
After all, maybe the U.S. Supreme Court does not really matter.

